In this study, we evaluate how individual virtues and inter-organizational management control systems (IOMCS) influence buyer-supplier performance through relationship quality. Results 
Introduction
Companies increasingly rely on partners to access complementary resources and skills, protect their markets, win new market share, and share risks. Their success and sustainability thus depend largely on their ability to build "good" collaborations, defined as relationships marked by trust and closeness, long-term orientation, and satisfaction for all parties (Crosby et al., 1990) . The antecedents that lead to good relationships between buyer and supplier firms and their links with firm performance thus have attracted the attention of researchers in diverse fields, such as marketing, strategy, organizational behavior, management control, and operations management. Such studies on inter-organizational relationships in turn have led to the integration of new variables linked to individual behaviors and virtues. Ethics is an area of study that deals with ideas about what is good and bad behavior, as well as a branch of philosophy dealing with what is morally right or wrong, but philosophers have tried not to limit ethics to merely a theoretical concept. Aristotle for example approached virtues of character as dispositions to act in certain ways in response to similar situations or habits of behavior. Thus, good conduct arises from habits that can be acquired only through repeated action and correction. In this sense, ethics is an intensely practical discipline.
In line with this philosophical tradition, scholars have long been interested in the integration of ethical elements and virtues in supply chain management practices (Blome and Paulraj, 2013; Carter and Jennings, 2004; Drake and Schlachter, 2008) . Their findings suggest the need for further research into the components of an ethical climate and their combined effects on relationship quality and performance. To identify additional components, a promising avenue might be to focus on individual levels and personal codes of conduct. To the best of our knowledge, no previous study has examined the link between the individual virtues of collaborators and the quality and performance of inter-organizational relations.
Thus, the influence of individual moral virtues on organizational performance has yet to be explored, even though individuals-namely, boundary spanners-are in charge of interorganizational relationships (Doney and Cannon, 1997) and part of ethical programs driven by moral virtues. In an organization that emphasizes ethical behaviors, it is important that moral virtues are not confined to top management but embrace the whole organization, especially those members who are in relationships with external partners such as clients or suppliers. We therefore depart from previous studies on general organizational ethical virtues (Cameron et al., , 2011 by focusing on individual virtues.
Performance questions also require consideration of research into management control Ding et al., 3013) , which constitutes one of main devices to facilitate coordination and cooperation in inter-organizational relationships. Organizations must select good partners (i.e., those with the required competences and behaviors) and design appropriate management control systems (e.g., planning, feedback, incentives) to foster relationship quality and promote efficient, effective cooperation (Caglio and Ditillo, 2008; Dekker, 2008; Mahama, 2006) .
No study has mixed these two approaches in a single model to explicate their respective effects on relationship quality and performance. We try to fill this gap by analyzing two likely antecedents of relationship quality and performance: the individual virtues of boundary spanners and inter-organizational management control systems (IOMCS). Through a quantitative empirical analysis of 232 inter-organizational relationships, focusing on buyersupplier relationships, we determine that individual ethical behaviors exert a stronger impact than control systems on overall business performance. With these findings, we contribute to literature on both individual virtues and inter-organizational management control systems.
Literature Review and Hypotheses

Virtues and Pertinence of Virtues
The first mentions of virtues were by Greek and Latin philosophers, who asked about moral duties and the best in human beings in their effort to identify the "good life" and happiness. In a philosophical view, virtues are moral dispositions to act deliberately and in positive ways for both the individual and society (MacIntyre, 2007) . Virtues are specific properties of a thing or a being; they are not given. Instead, they are acquired by individuals, who then convey and develop them to achieve some accomplishment.
No definitive summary of virtues exists though, because each text, author, and tradition offers its own list. Therefore, there are many-some even potentially competingsets of virtues (Sison and Ferrero, 2015) . However, the ancient philosophical tradition refers to four main virtues that provide great ease, control, and satisfaction. These "cardinal virtues"
are the "pivots" of human action (i.e., in Latin cardo, meaning hinge or pivot) and determine the other virtues. According to Plato, they are wisdom (IV, 429a-428b), courage (IV, 429a-430c), temperance (IV, , and justice (IV, 444a-432b). These firm attitudes, stable dispositions, and habitual perfections regulate actions, order passions, and guide conduct. In the Aristotelian tradition, Cicero also highlights the status of wisdom and favors courage, temperance, justice, and prudence (XXXIII, 118) . 1 The following virtues are the most widely cited in organizational research literature (Gotsis and Grimani, 2015) :
• Justice [δικαιοσύνη-dikaiosynē], which corresponds to what is legitimate for the good of others and helps ensure the preservation of organized society, by promoting and strengthening it (Small, 2013) ;
1 Small (2013) provides a more comprehensive analysis of Cicero's conception of virtues.
• Courage [ἀνδρεία-andreia] provides the will to do what is good and to act with determination. It refers to the greatness and strength of a noble and invincible spirit;
• Prudence [φρόνησις-phronēsis] , in the ancient sense of "practical wisdom," 2 supports the accurate appreciation of a situation and practical knowledge about how to proceed (Sison and Ferrero, 2015) . A prudent person thinks about the best to attain the good. Prudence usually comes with age and experience, which provide more appropriate perceptions of what is salient across various contexts; and
• Temperance [σωφροσύνη-temperantia] implies acting in balance and adapting actions to reality. It refers to self-control and moderation in everything said and done (Small, 2013) .
Philosophers offer complex justifications of the hierarchical positions of different virtues, and none of these discussions can be considered closed (Small, 2013) . However, general agreement exists that even if each virtue always has a particular function, it also is present in the others, because each virtue requires the others (Plato in Protagoras). For example, courage without caution is rashness; without temperance, it is uncontrolled impulse (Aristotle IN, II, 7) . It is the combination of virtues that leads to virtuousness and the disposition to act for the best.
Virtues as Antecedents of Relationship Quality and Performance
Saini (2010) proposes a conceptual framework of purchasing ethics and interorganizational relational determinants that predicts direct influences among interorganizational power, long-term orientation, personal ties, and ethical-or unethicalpurchasing practices. Blome and Paulraj (2013) Cameron et al. (2004) show that virtuousness (which comprises optimism, trust, compassion, integrity, and forgiveness) favors innovation, customer retention, employee stability, quality, and profitability through both amplifying and buffering effects. The amplifying effect creates self-reinforcing positive spirals, whereas the buffering effect protects the organization from traumas, such as downsizing. Caza et al. (2004) further find that virtuous firms make more money than others. Cameron et al. (2011) consider additional virtuousness practices (caring, gratitude, respect) as antecedents of organizational effectiveness and financial performance.
We posit that these organizational performance effects arise in the context of interorganizational relations as well, such that the individual virtues of boundary spanners should have a positive impact on firm performance. Formally, we hypothesize:
H1: Virtues are positively related to (a) relationship quality and (b) firm performance.
Research in inter-organizational relationships in control management settings is relatively sparse. It follows from Hopwood's (1996) call to investigate control over external collaboration, given that businesses in a global economy transcend organizational boundaries.
Inter-organizational relationships are not easy to create, develop, or support; they require considerable time and effort to structure and achieve each organization's goals (Meira et al., 2010) . Two main control issues emerge from such relationships: coordination problems related to the interdependence of tasks and cooperation problems due to the divergence of interests (Caglio and Ditillo, 2008) . Accordingly, inter-organizational relationships require specific control systems or inter-organizational management control systems (IOMCS).
Applying Merchant and van der Stede's (2007, p. 5 ) definition, we conceive of IOMCS as the totality of devices or systems that members of an organization set up to influence the decision-making process and behavior of members of another organization, such that they seek to increase the chances of achieving business objectives and the required performance.
Usually, IOMCS are complex, comprised of many elements that are designed to encourage coordination and cooperation. Yet the elements often are studied individually or according to a specific subset of mechanisms that are relevant to inter-firm relationships (Caglio and Ditillo, 2008) , such as information systems (Tomkins, 2001) , outcome controls such as goal setting, incentive systems, performance monitoring or rewards (Dekker, 2004) , behavioral controls such as structural specifications and behavior monitoring (Dekker, 2004) , performance measurement systems and socialization (Mahama, 2006) , target setting and operational reviews , partner selection criteria or business contracts (Ding et al., 2013) .
IOMCS as Antecedents of Relationship Quality and Performance
Few quantitative studies (Dekker, 2008; Dekker et al., 2013; Ding et al., 2013; Mahama, 2006) Mahama (2006) reduces performance to economic and operational results, whereas the performance of an inter-organizational relationship is multidimensional. It includes various sources of competitive advantage, including access to innovations, the development of competencies, and, more generally, partners' global satisfaction (Athanasopoulou, 2009) . Moreover, performance management systems are just one formal aspect of IOMCS. We propose an extended consideration of these systems.
Control systems measure and reward performance; they are intended to favor coordination requirements among stakeholders and reduce divergent interests by aligning incentives (Velez et al., 2008) . Such systems consist of a structure and a set of mechanisms (Langfield-Smith, 2008) . Because IOMCS aim to encourage both internal and external stakeholders to engage in greater coordination, the structure should promote both internal (e.g., matrix structure, transversal projects) and external (e.g., joint seminars with partners)
collaboration. This assertion has not been empirically tested. However, it is reasonable to expect that internal and external control structures designed to encourage collaborative relationships lead to better quality inter-organizational relationships and increased overall performance. The costs of such control structures may be high (White and Lui, 2005) and could negatively affect economic performance. Nevertheless, from a collaborative perspective, the multifaceted benefits of coordination should exceed the costs of the control structure, largely due to actions that favor joint action, delivery, quality, or innovation.
With regard to the second control issue, that is, functional cooperation, control systems can facilitate goal setting and enable regular evaluations of the relationship. The link between control systems and the quality of an inter-organizational relationship continues to be debated in extant literature. That is, controls involve monitoring and thus mistrust, so they could negatively affect relationship quality (Das and Teng, 1998; Ghoshal and Moran, 1996 ).
Yet controls also provide an opportunity for parties to discuss and get to know each other better, which allows them to refine and better target the mechanisms, such that they enter into a mutual learning process that ultimately is beneficial to their cooperation (Poppo and Zenger, 2002) . The outcome may depend on the orientation of the control systems and the underlying corporate strategy. If the strategy aims to develop collaborative relationships-as modern business trends suggest increasingly is the case-control systems might foster trust (Coletti et al., 2005) . Therefore, as Langfield-Smith (1997) suggests, organizations should use IOMCS to gain cooperation and focus efforts on the collective. We hypothesize:
H2: IOMCS are positively related to (a) relationship quality and (b) firm performance.
Relationship Quality and Performance
The quality of inter-organizational relationships has been the focus of many studies, especially by researchers in marketing (for reviews, see Athanasopoulou, 2009; Huntley, 2006) . Because the notion of relationship quality is multidimensional, its precise meaning shifts, depending on the context. However, it mostly integrates the satisfaction of the partners (Garbarino and Johnson, 1999; Huntley, 2006; Walter et al., 2003) , their commitment (Friman relational norms (Siguaw et al., 1998) , an absence of opportunism (Johnson, 1999) , and a lack of conflict (Sanzo et al., 2003) . Across these propositions, relational quality is described as generating positive effects, evolving over time, and supporting relationship continuity, while reducing each partner's perceived risks (Athanasopoulou, 2009) . For this study, we anchor our definition on these common propositions and definitions, such that we approach interorganizational relationship quality as a perceptual measure of the level of sustainable, reciprocal cooperation between business partners.
Prior studies indicate that relationship quality improves performance (for a review, see Athanasopoulou, 2009) , in terms of profits (Siguaw et al., 1998) , market and financial performance (Autry et al., 2008) , customer value (Palmatier, 2008) , and operations such as cost, quality, delivery, and flexibility (Fynes et al., 2005 (Fynes et al., , 2008 . The positive impact of relationship quality on sales effectiveness remains to be validated (Boles et al., 2000; Crosby et al., 1990) . Mostly, these studies focus on a few dimensions of relationship quality (trust, commitment, satisfaction, or some combination) and then address one aspect of performance.
No empirical study analyzes the impact of relationship quality on performance by combining operational, financial, future, and reciprocal benefits. We aim to fill this gap and hypothesize:
H3: Relationship quality is positively related to firm performance.
Our conceptual model is in Figure 1 . Restricting a study's scope to one geographical area is common practice in this field (e.g., Madrid-Guijarro et al., 2009; Niskanen and Niskanen, 2010) , in that it not only facilitates the data collection process but also ensures relatively homogeneous environmental conditions. Such homogeneity reduces the impact of extraneous variables. The invitation email included a cover letter explaining that the study was supported by the Fund for Innovation in Industry (F2I) and various regional public institutions. The CEO was asked to forward the questionnaire to the most qualified people in the firm. At the beginning of the questionnaire, respondents were asked to think of a specific collaboration, using the following prompt: "This investigation concerns your relationship with your main supplier/customer. We will ask you some questions … in order to get your opinion on this relationship."
The data set contained 232 responses, which translate into a final response rate of 11.6%. Compared with standards in the field for this type of study (Bartholomew and Smith, 2006; Baruch and Holtom, 2008) , this rate is satisfactory. We dropped 31 questionnaires due to missing data and thus were left with a final sample size of 201 firms. Table A in Appendix 1 presents the sample characteristics.
Measures and Construct Operationalization
Measures
As we detail in Appendix 2, 14 variables represent the virtues construct, four variables measure the IOMCS, three pertain to relationship quality, and eight refer to performance.
Measuring philosophical concepts as broad as virtues could entail substantial controversy, because several measurement scales relate to different virtues. We define a set of items linked to the cardinal virtues of justice, courage, prudence, and temperance, all of which had been used in previously validated scales. In particular, we followed Shanahan and Hyman (2003) , who developed a virtue ethics scale based on a list of 45 virtues provided by Solomon (1999) and Cameron et al. (2011) . Our complete list includes 14 items, measured with a 10-point Likert-type scale ranging from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree."
Because the concept of IOMCS comes from management control literature, we adopt a common characterization of management control systems in the field, namely, control structure and mechanisms (Langfield-Smith, 2008) . To measure IOMCS, we relied on items that could characterize the control structure and control mechanisms. Control structure refers to the collaborative structure, whether internal (matrix organization, cross-cutting projects favoring lateral collaboration) or external (joint training, seminars combining the suppliers), that has been designed to facilitate joint action, information sharing, and problem solving. To characterize the control mechanisms, we retained one item about the target setting Mahama, 2006) and one for feedback reviews for evaluation. Thus we combined four items and measured them on a 10-point Likert-type scale, ranging from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree."
Relationship quality is measured by three items that encompass the three dimensions proposed by Walter et al. (2003) : trust, satisfaction with the collaboration, and long-term commitment. It also echoes propositions by Jap et al. (1999) to consider relationship quality in the form of attitudes, processes, and future expectations. Trust reflects attitudes, ongoing satisfaction is used to refer to processes, and long-term commitment involves expectations.
All items were scored on a 10-point Likert-type scale, ranging from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree."
Performance has also been measured in multiple ways, and most studies focus on one specific aspect, such as measures of partners' satisfaction or more objective measures of operational efficiency or profitability. Our objective was to assess the overall and global performance of the relationship, so we took into account operational performance (quality and on-time delivery), economic performance (margins), project management performance for long-term relationships, the development of competencies, and innovation (Griffith and Zhao, 2015; Heide et al., 2014; Sjoerdsma and van Weele, 2015) . For a global assessment of performance, we also measured satisfaction in terms of mutual benefits and achievement of expectations (Yilmaz et al., 2004) . Therefore, we have eight items representing the performance construct; all of them were scored on a 10-point Likert-type scale, ranging from 1 ("strongly disagree") to 10 ("strongly agree").
We controlled for the effects of five variables. Firm size was measured according to the three categories established by the European classification, as small firms 4 (PME, 10-249 employees), medium firms (ETI, 250-4999 employees), and large firms (GE, more than 5000 employees). This variable was coded as a dummy variable, and "large firms" served as the reference category (as in Field et al., 2012) . We also controlled for the effect of the firms' activity sector (0 = industry, 1 = service). Because buyers and suppliers may have different perceptions of their business relationship (Ambrose et al., 2010) , we controlled for the firm's status (0 = supplier, 1 = buyer). Then we took into account the buyer's and the supplier's dependence, in line with studies on the role of dependency in inter-organizational relationships (Colwell et al., 2011) . These measures used a Likert scale ranging from 1 ("strongly disagree") to 10 ("strongly agree"): "It would be difficult to the firm concerned by this evaluation replacing us in similar conditions" and "It would be difficult for us replacing the firm concerned by this evaluation in similar conditions." Because socially responsible firms are supposed to offer better performance (Bocquet et al., 2015) , we controlled for the firm's adoption of corporate social responsibility practices (0 for firms not engaged in corporate social responsibility [CSR] , and 1 for those engaged in CSR).
Construct Operationalization
To test the hypotheses, we applied data reduction for subsequent applications in other statistical techniques. Through principal component analysis, we tested the unidimensionality of our constructs (Hair et al., 2010) . Then we created four new variables, representing each construct, and used them in multivariate regression analyses. After we confirmed the unidimensionality of the constructs, we tested their reliability. All constructs achieved satisfactory Cronbach's alphas between .71 and .95 (Hair et al., 2010) . 
Results
To analyze the influences of actors' virtues and IOMCS on relationship quality and performance, we conducted a two-step analysis. In the first step, we evaluated the effect of each independent variable individually through ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions (see Tables 2 and 3 ). Virtues are positively related to relationship quality and performance (Table 2 ), in support of H1a and H1b. The same holds true for IOMCS (Table 3) , which relates positively to relationship quality and performance, in support of H2a and H2b. With regard to the effects of the control variables, we observe ( Table 2 ) that buyer firms report having higher relationship quality than supplier firms. Firms' activity sector is statistically significant in the relationship of IOMCS with relationship quality and performance (Table 3 ). Service firms exhibit higher relationship quality and higher performance than manufacturing firms. In the second step of our analysis, we accounted for the simultaneous effect of virtues and IOMCS on relationship quality and firm performance (see Table 4 ). Again, we observed that virtues are positively related to relationship quality and performance, which fully corroborates H1a and H1b. However, the effect of IOMCS on buyer-supplier relationship quality is not statistically significant. Thus, when virtues are included in the analysis, we do not have evidence to support H2a. However, IOMCS are still positively related to firm performance, which fully supports H2b. Finally, relationship quality is positively related to firm performance, in support of H3. 
Multicollinearity Issues
The fact that IOMCS is not significantly related to relationship quality when virtues are included in the model raises the question of multicollinearity issues. Our independent variables had significant and high positive correlations (see Table B in Appendix 1), so we ran several tests. First, we analyzed the correlation measures (Table 1) and noted any correlation greater than .9, which Hair et al. (2010) call a first indication of multicollinearity.
We also examined the values of tolerance and variance inflation factors (VIF) ( Therefore, we find no concerns with first-order, linear, auto-correlation in our analysis.
Post Hoc Analyses
We did not specifically hypothesize mediating effects of relationship quality, because of the insufficient support from existing theory. In line with Blome and Paulraj (2013), we conducted additional post hoc analyses to test for the mediating effects of relationship quality in our hypothesized model. We thus performed a two-step analysis to test relationship quality as a mediator of the effects of virtues and IOMCS on firm performance.
A common method to test mediation is the casual steps strategy (Baron and Kenny, 1986 ). Zhao et al. (2010) point out the limitations of Baron and Kenny's (1986) procedure to evaluate mediation though and suggest that the only requirement to demonstrate mediation is a test of the indirect effect (or ab term) with a bootstrap method. They suggest the bootstrap 5 Conditional indices values greater than 30 and correlation values greater than .9 indicate multicollinearity problems (Hair et al., 2010) . Even if we were to proceed to the second step using a threshold value of 15 (instead of 30) for the condition index, we would select only one coefficient loading higher than .9 (the intercept).
test implemented by Hayes (2004, 2008 ) is superior for evaluating indirect effects. Unlike the casual steps strategy, it tests the mediation hypothesis not by focusing on the individual paths in the mediation model but instead by analyzing the indirect effect (ab term), with the logic that this product is equal to the difference between the total and the direct effects of X on Y (Preacher and Hayes, 2008) . Accordingly, we use the approach proposed by Hayes (2004, 2008) and Hayes (2013) . Controlling for firm status, supplier/buyer dependence, CSR practices, firm size, and activity sector, we first test the indirect effects of IOMCS and virtues individually, and then perform a mediation analysis that includes both variables in the mediation model. The results are in Table 5 . 
Individual indirect effects
According to the mediation analysis conducted using OLS path analysis, virtues indirectly influence performance through the effects on relationship quality. A bias-corrected bootstrap confidence interval for the indirect effect of virtue (ab = .224) based on 5,000 bootstrap samples was entirely above 0 (.1032 to .3392). However, the indirect effect of virtues on performance through relationship quality was less important than its direct effect (what Baron and Kenny [1986] call partial mediation).
Regarding the indirect effect of IOMCS on performance, we observed a mediation effect by relationship quality. A bias-corrected bootstrap confidence interval for the indirect effect of IOMCS (ab = .345) based on 5,000 bootstrap samples was entirely above 0 (.2580 to .4380). The indirect effect of IOMCS on performance through relationship quality also was greater than its direct effect.
Virtues and IOMCS as covariates
When According to Hayes (2013) , including highly correlated multiple independent variables (or covariate variables) in a mediation model can be problematic. When included as the sole independent variable, each variable exerts a direct or indirect effect on Y through M. But, when considered together, neither appears to have any effect. In our study, IOMCS correlated moderately with relationship quality and strongly with performance (Evans, 1996) . In contrast, virtues showed a very strong correlation with relationship quality. When virtues were included in the mediation model as a covariate, the importance of IOMCS was decreased by this very strong correlation (Evans, 1996) . However, its direct and total effects on performance were still significant. Similarly, for virtues, the direct, indirect, and total effects on performance were all still significant. Table 6 presents a synthesis of our results. 
Discussion
Consistent with existing buyer-supplier relationship performance research, this study provides evidence that relationship quality generates firm performance (Autry et al., 2008; Fynes et al., 2005 Fynes et al., , 2008 Palmatier, 2008; Siguaw et al., 1998) . However, unlike previous studies (Athanasopoulou, 2009 ), we adopt a global measure of performance. We focus on operational and economic benefits regarding the margins, delays, and level of product/service quality. We also consider strategic matters, such as competence enhancement, joint project management, ability to innovate, and overall performance of the cooperation, such as mutual benefits and need fulfillment. The reliability of our global performance scale implies its suitability for further research into the performance of buyer-supplier relationships.
Regarding the operationalization of virtues, our results provide both methodological and theoretical contributions. We did not test the effects of a unique virtue, as Argandona (2015) By focusing on justice, prudence, courage and temperance, we cover the cardinal virtues that are keystones of human action and determine other virtues (Riggio et al., 2010) .
The one-factor solution for the virtues construct highlights that each component depends on the others. Furthermore, it is perfectly in line with Aristotelian theory, which predicts that a separate virtue will become a vice.
The corroboration of our two hypotheses linking individual virtues to relationship quality (H1a) and to performance (H1b) also is an important finding. It contributes to emergent literature on the role of virtues as a vector of firm performance. Whereas previous studies address virtues at an organizational level , we insist on individual aspects and demonstrate the importance of virtuous human qualities for organizational outcomes and benefits. This result completes and deepens prior studies highlighting the positive influence of ethical behavior through individual virtues on performance.
The findings on the role of IOMCS can be analyzed at two levels. First, the regression model to test the direct impacts of IOMCS on relationship quality and performance validates the predicted positive links. In terms of collaborative structure and control mechanisms, IOMCS favors both relationship quality and performance, in line with Mahama (2006) .
However, our conception of IOMCS is not limited to performance measurement systems; it includes other elements that favor coordination and cooperation, such as the internal and external structure, targeting, and feedback/evaluation processes. We therefore answer Caglio and Ditillo's (2008) call to consider the full complexity of IOMCS, not just one subset of its mechanisms. Moreover, our conception of performance goes beyond operational (costs, ontime delivery, and quality; Mahama 2006). We instead have integrated strategic aspects that are crucial to long-term relationships and need more attention from researchers.
Second, in the post hoc tests of IOMCS's indirect effects, it is interesting to note that, when virtues are not considered in the model, the indirect IOMCS-quality-performance link is stronger than the direct IOMCS-performance link. That is, firms with higher IOMCS levels tend to develop better relationship quality which translates into higher firm performance. This result contributes to the long-standing debate about the influence of control on trust and cooperation. Supporters of the complementarity between formal control mechanisms and the formation of trust and high-quality relationships (Coletti et al., 2005; Poppo and Zenger, 2002) have demonstrated that control has no negative effect on cooperation. We add to this view by showing that control actually encourages cooperation and leads to better overall performance, a proposal that has not been demonstrated previously.
An important contribution of this study is the simultaneous analysis of the roles of This result has two major implications. First, the success of inter-organizational relationships relies on the intrinsic qualities of individuals, whereas prior research has been almost exclusively concerned with the obvious characteristics of organizations (expertise, reputation, costs, commercial efficiency). Very few researchers study organizations and individuals in inter-organizational relationships. For example, Doney and Cannon (1997) demonstrate that the expertise and likability of boundary spanners (i.e., vendors) improved inter-personal trust, whereas Zaheer et al. (1998) could not validate links between the reliability, predictability, and fairness of the boundary spanners and firm performance. Our The finding that virtues have more influence on the quality of relationships and firm performance than IOMCS also implies that special effort must be dedicated to finding and selecting virtuous partners. This result reinforces Dekker's (2004 Dekker's ( , 2008 findings about the selection phase. Choosing a corporate partner based on the virtue of its members is a form of control by values, well known in the field of organizational control (Berry et al., 1995) but not yet explored in the field of inter-organizational control.
Our results provide empirical support for an important element in the Aristotelian philosophy on virtues, which holds that a person is not born virtuous but becomes it.
Therefore, choosing virtuous people is not enough: the firm should encourage such behaviors by setting up appropriate organizational and managerial procedures.
Conclusion
The objective of this research is to compare the respective roles of individual virtues and management control systems on relationship quality and performance and thereby analyze the mediating role of quality relationships on the link between both virtues and control systems on firm performance. With a sample of 232 French buyer and supplier firms, our study shows that both elements have a positive and very significant impact on quality relationships and performance. However, testing the whole model leads to evidence that the impact of virtues is more crucial and predominant.
The main theoretical contribution of our study is our comparison of the antecedents of relationship quality at individual and organizational levels. We evaluate the impact of virtues and IOMCS on buyer-supplier relationship quality and performance and find that virtues and IOMCS both relate positively to firm performance but that IOMCS relate positively to relationship quality only if the virtues (which have the strongest impact on relationship quality) are not considered in the model. In a series of post hoc analyses, we tested relationship quality as a mediator of the effects that virtues and IOMCS have on performance.
These results confirmed that relationship quality mediates the effect of IOMCS on performance only if virtues are not considered in the mediation model. Specifically, virtues have a greater impact than IOMCS on relationship quality and performance.
We also contribute to literature on virtues and ethical considerations, and on organizational control systems, by showing that the latter should support the individual, not the other way around. This result is reinforced by our finding that organizational engagement in CSR has no impact, which means that the focus should be on individuals first, before organizationally responsible engagements. This important finding related to the respective roles of individuals and organizations in terms of ensuring good collaborations and thus organizational (long-term) performance should be granted greater precedence in research on business ethics. This interesting theoretical contribution also has managerial implications at a time when research ethics still needs to demonstrate that ethical behaviors contribute to business performance.
These results thereby suggest some important managerial implications. As individual virtues outperform IOMCS, they should, from a managerial perspective, be addressed more prominently than IOMCS. This result is particularly notable for modern organizational settings, in which managers usually are incentivized to implement perfect, standardized, and formalized processes that minimize individual impacts on business practices. They highlight the importance of recruiting employees with virtues and further developing them as a way to ensure better buyer-supplier relationship quality and performance. Therefore, to favor interorganizational collaboration in a buyer-supplier relationship context, managers should pay more attention to hiring virtuous employees instead of focusing on implementing control systems. Managers should attend to this aspect when they recruit people who will engage in buyer-supplier relationships. The management and development of employees' virtues and implementation of appropriate control systems also is crucial to favor such behaviors, which in turn can strengthen inter-organizational collaboration in buyer-supplier relationships.
This research is not exempt from some limitations, which lead to several avenues for further research. Although representative of the French population, the sample is small, making it difficult to distinguish among different types of manufacturing industries. Further studies with larger samples could reveal that results may vary according to whether the industry is very hierarchical, with strict vertical relationships (e.g., automotive, defense), or not. Another methodological limitation stems from the available measures in our database.
Our measure for virtues seems satisfactory, and that for IOMCS is original, taking into account the efforts by the organization to integrate both internal and external collaboration.
The measure of quality relationships focuses on three main variables but could integrate more items. Our objective was not to focus on this concept though, which already has been explicated in prior research. Further studies with enriched measures might not lead to a single construct, as in our study, which could enable researchers to distinguish which relationship aspects the virtues affect more. Finally, we concentrated on the roles of virtues and control systems, but other individual or organizational antecedents of quality relationships could be taken into account. A lot remains to be done in the field of ethics and individual virtues. Note: Sample size = 201 respondents. The response scale for the following four constructs items ranged from 1 ("strongly disagree") to 10 ("strongly agree").
Virtues
In general, our partners in the enterprise concerned by the relationship 1.1. …pursue their goals while seeking to preserve our interests. 
Control variables
Firm status: 0 (supplier) to 1 (buyer) 5.1. Do you participate in this study as a buyer or a supplier? Firm size: 1 (PME, 10 to 249 employees), 2 (ETI, 250 to 4,999 employees); 3 (GE, more than 5,000). 5.2. How many employees does your company have? Firm dependence: 1(strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly agree) 5.3. It would be difficult to the firm concerned by this evaluation replacing us in similar conditions. 5.4. It would be difficult for us replacing the firm concerned by this evaluation in similar conditions. Firm corporate social responsibility practices: 0 (no) to 1 (yes) 5.5. Is your organization engaged in corporate social responsibility practices? Firm activity sector: 0 (industry) to 1 (service) 5.6. Which is the activity sector of your company?
